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A Look at Nickel & Why It’s The Best Performing Metal of 2019

nickel price chart

The majority of resource sector investors are currently focused on precious metals, which I think is justified. Whether it be a trade war, the issuing of 30 year bonds with a negative yield, or the lowering of interests rates, clearly, there are issues with the global financial system that need to be rectified.

Precious metals, therefore, are acting like any insurance policy; their price is rising along with the increase in risk.

With that said, nickel has actually been the best performing metal of 2019 to date. Its price has risen more than 50% in the last 2 months and, today, sits at around US$8 per pound – a level not seen since 2014.

I have become well acquainted with the nickel market over the last few years and am really not surprised by the sudden price move; to me, it was inevitable. There are a number of factors that could drive the nickel price even higher in the future, the export ban in Indonesia being just one of them.

Today, I have for you an interview with someone who lives the nickel market every day, Martin Turenne, CEO of FPX Nickel Corp.

In our conversation, we touch on the history and strategy behind the Indonesian export ban, the various nickel end products in the market, global nickel inventories, the affect of the environmental policy moving forward and, finally, an update on FPX Nickel, which has recently released some fantastic news with regards to the Baptiste Deposit’s metallurgy.

Enjoy!

Brian: Many of the headlines surrounding this recent surge in the nickel price have concentrated on the Indonesian export ban and for good reason. In 2014, Indonesia introduced the first export ban and within 6 months the nickel price spiked above US$9 per pound. Now, 5 years later and the same scenario appears to be playing out.

Firstly, could you give us some historical background on why Indonesia instituted a nickel export ban in 2014?

Martin: Indonesian mines produce about 25% of the world’s nickel mine supply, but the country has traditionally been lacking in domestic refining capacity – for a long time, they were simply shipping low-value, unprocessed ore to refineries in China. Indonesians have a long history of resource nationalism, and the export ban in 2014 was implemented to force companies to build smelters in Indonesia so that the country could enjoy more of the economic benefits of producing refined nickel  — to generate economic activity from capital investment and job creation. The ban was at least partly successful in achieving that goal – Indonesia is now a major producer of refined nickel.

Brian: Secondly, why are they having to ban exports again? Did the 2014 ban not produce the results they had intended?

Martin: After implementing the ore export ban in 2014, the Indonesian government partially relaxed the ban in 2017 to allow for the export of some ore by those companies which had committed to building smelters in-country. The buildout of those smelters was moderately successful, but it wasn’t happening as quickly as the Indonesian government would like it to. So, the re-implementation of a full ban is driven in part by the Indonesian government’s desire to force companies to act more swiftly in building out those smelters.

Brian: Background context is important, but really, what matters to investors is the impact of the export ban.

What is the impact of the export ban on the global market supply?

Martin:

There has been some good analysis come out in the past few days from BMO and Wood Mackenzie which concludes that the export ban will result in a 5-10% reduction in nickel supply for the next 2-4 years, versus their previous supply assumptions. The nickel market has already been in a long-term structural shortage since 2016, so this additional supply disruption is a major event. This could lead to the nickel price being sustainably higher for the next few years.

Brian: Examining the nickel price chart, while initially, instituting the nickel export ban in 2014 spiked the price, the impact seems to have dramatically declined in the second half of the year, bringing the price back to where it started at the end of 2014.

Today’s market looks much different than it did in 2014 – for a number of reasons. The first thing that comes to my mind is global nickel inventories, which are nearly half the levels in 2014.

For example, looking at the LME nickel warehouse levels, it shows that current inventory is sitting at roughly 150,000 tonnes. 

An important question rarely asked, possibly out of ignorance, is what type of nickel makes up the Global inventories?

Martin: LME inventory is comprised entirely of Class 1 nickel products, typically briquettes, pellets and cathode – to qualify as a Class 1, the nickel product must contain 99.8% nickel, so basically pure nickel.

Brian: Okay, this brings us to a common misconception, that nickel sulphide mines produce class 1 nickel, which is incorrect.   

So it begs the question, who does feed the Class 1 nickel market?

Martin:

As I’ve said, Class 1 nickel is basically a pure nickel product. Class 2 nickel products have less nickel content, but they contain significant amounts of iron, which makes them highly sought after by stainless steel producers.

Class 1 nickel comes from both sulphide and laterite nickel mines. For both sulphide and laterite ore, there are several refining and processing steps required to convert the ore into a concentrate or slurry and then ultimately into Class 1 nickel – oftentimes, it’s the refiners and smelters who enjoy better margins than the actual miners themselves. That’s part of the reason that the nickel industry tends to be vertically integrated – if you’re a miner having to sell your product to a third party smelter, you are at the mercy of smelter payment terms.

Brian: Can you give us a break down of the most common end products produced by mining operations and how they fit into the global nickel market supply?

Martin: The nickel produced at most mine sites is not Class 1 nickel – sulphide miners typically produce nickel concentrate with about 15% nickel content, and laterite miners mostly produce Class 2 nickel in the form of ferronickel or nickel pig iron (NPI) with a nickel content ranging between 10% and 30%. Nickel sulphide concentrates are typically sold for a relatively low value (70-75% of the LME nickel price) to smelters, who then smelt and refine the nickel toward the ultimate production of a Class 1 nickel product. Ferronickel and NPI, on the other hand, bypass the smelting process and are sold directly to stainless steel producers for relatively high value (95-100% of the LME nickel price) due to the value of the iron contained in those products.

Source: Canaccord Genuity

Brian: Keeping with the nickel supply side discussion, recently it was reported that there was a waste spill from the Chinese owned Ramu nickel mine in Papua New Guinea. The red discharge spilled from the mine was found clouding the waters of Basamuk Bay.

Personally, I only see the environment becoming a bigger issue in the future, as it’s become a hot politically driven subject.

Do you think more stringent environmental regulations will affect nickel supply in the future? If so, please explain.

Martin: In the last year alone, we’ve seen environmental and social issues lead to the closure or the threatened closure of mines in Papua New Guinea, Myanmar, Guatemala and Brazil – and that’s to say nothing of the ongoing environmental inspections in the Philippines, which is one of the largest producers of nickel globally. Well over 60% of nickel mine supply comes from emerging economies with lower environmental and social licence standards than say, Canada or Australia. As environmental and social concerns become more prominent in those emerging countries, that will ultimately lead to either the closure of certain nickel mines, or to increased operating costs for miners having to comply with higher standards. Over time, this will lead to an increase in the nickel cost curve, and therefore in the nickel price.

Brian: We have discussed all supply side issues within this interview on the current nickel market, which, in terms of gauging how strong the nickel market could be, it’s supply driven bull markets that are the strongest.

None of us have crystal balls, but in your opinion, is it realistic to think that we will see nickel prices higher than US$7.50 over the next 12 months?

Martin: Before the recent announcement regarding the Indonesian export ban, the long-term consensus nickel price forecast was $7.50/lb. The implementation of the export ban has accelerated the spot price move upward. We would expect to see more volatility in the nickel price over the next 12 months, but the updated forecasts from BMO and Goldman Sachs are already projecting an $8 to $9 price in that timeframe.

Brian: A few weeks ago, FPX released the results of their metallurgical optimization program which began late last fall. In my opinion, the results look great and should give the company a relatively unique end product which can bypass the smelter and be sold directly to the end user.

Firstly, can you give us an overview of the results? Secondly, can you speak to the possible benefits of being able to bypass the smelter?

Martin: The new metallurgical results mark a huge breakthrough for FPX. First, we are seeing recoveries in the range of 83-94%, which is a big improvement over the 82% recovery in the 2013 PEA – this will lead to an increase in projected nickel production and lower the unit cost of production. Second, we are now producing a separate iron ore by-product for the first time in the project’s history; depending on the market for our iron concentrate, this new product stream could have a positive impact on project economics. Third, the nickel concentrate we are now producing grades 63-65% versus the 13.5% concentrate in the previous PEA. Producing this high-grade concentrate means we will likely get paid a lot more for the product, something in the range of 90-95% of the LME nickel price, compared to the 75% payability assumption in the previous PEA. That’s because this high-grade concentrate is very low in penalty elements like sulphur and phosphorus, which means it will by-pass smelters and can be directly fed to stainless steel producers. By cutting out the smelter middle man, we can yield the types of payables achieved by similar products like ferronickel and NPI.

Brian: The metallurgical results certainly didn’t go unnoticed, as FPX’s recent private placement was oversubscribed. Now, with the influx of cash and the work completed over the last few years, I assume we may be headed for an update to the 2013 PEA in 2020.

What is the plan for 2020? Will we see an update to the 2013 PEA? Do the plans for 2020 require there to be sustained high nickel prices?

Martin:On closing our current private placement, we will have over $2 million in the treasury and will be fully funded to execute on more metallurgical test work, particularly leach testing of the nickel concentrates to understand if we can produce nickel in a form suitable for the EV battery market. Beyond that, and assuming the nickel price settles above the $7.00/lb level, we will be well positioned to deliver an updated PEA, with exact timing still to be confirmed.

Concluding Remarks

There is much to be gleaned from Turenne’s answers in the interview. In my opinion, many of the topics that we discussed are often over looked or misunderstood by investors. With this new or clarified knowledge of the nickel market dynamics, I think nickel investors are in a much better position to make informed investment decisions.

With that said, in my opinion, you should never buy a junior resource company because you are bullish on the price of the metal. Remember, junior resource companies are businesses that revolve around the people and their ability to execute on a plan which reflects the company’s overall vision.

If management can’t execute, nickel deposits don’t get discovered or developed and, therefore, no matter where the nickel price goes, you are most likely going to lose money.

I’m bullish on the future of nickel and, at the moment, am only invested in one junior nickel company – FPX Nickel Corp. (FPX:TSXV).

For those interested in knowing more about the nickel sector and why I believe FPX presents great risk to reward potential, check out these links:

2019 VRIC Presentation – Nickel: A Short and Long-Term Outlook

Nickel Laterite’s Integral Role in the Coming Nickel Boom

KE Report – Taking Note of the Run in Nickel

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Until next time,

Brian Leni  P.Eng

Founder – Junior Stock Review

Disclaimer: The following is not an investment recommendation, it is an investment idea. I am not a certified investment professional, nor do I know you and your individual investment needs. Please perform your own due diligence to decide whether this is a company and sector that is best suited for your personal investment criteria. I have NO business relationship with FPX Nickel Corp., however, I do own shares.

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Quebec Site Tour Visit Day 2 – Cartier Resources

Cartier Resources

Day 2 began at Cartier Resources’ offices in Val d’Or.  Interestingly, Cartier’s office walls are filled with field work photos, Chimo mine blueprints, deposit layouts, historical Val d’Or mining statistics and a whole host of other interesting pictures.

Personally, I thought this was a nice touch for visitors as it gives a good perspective on what the company has and is doing to move the company forward – a picture is worth a thousand words.

Cartier Resources (ECR:TSXV)

MCAP – $30.1 million (at the time of writing)

Shares – 177.1 million

Cash – roughly $6 million

CEO – Phillippe Cloutier is a geologist by trade with over 25 years of experience in mining exploration and development.

Cartier’s Business Plan

Cartier made it clear that using funds efficiently is their top priority; they started their presentation by outlining how they go about their exploration work with an added focus on how they planned their drill programs on the past producing Chimo mine property.

The talk was led by VP Dr. Gaetan Lavalliere, who is a professional geologist with over 25 years of experience in the mining industry. 

Cartier organizes their geological data to formulate a prioritized list of targets. By doing this, they are always focused on the targets that have the highest probability of returning good results for each dollar spent.

With regards to Chimo, the team was focused on 3 high priority targets from the deposit’s 24 zones.

It should come as no surprise that these zone extensions are mostly at depth, which fits the Abitibi shear zone related gold deposit model. Each of the companies that we visited on our trip were focused on targeting high grade gold mineralization at depth.

I believe Osisko’s ‘Discovery 1’ hole could prove to be a major catalyst for all the other companies with gold projects along the Abitibi, to follow suit and explore deeper…much deeper.

Cartier’s zone extension drilling, in my opinion, has been a success with some very good grades and widths. Reviewing the images above, which were provided by Cartier, you can clearly see how the drilling was systematically planned to delineate the gold mineralization.

If I were to have a criticism of Cartier, it would be that they don’t have any 43-101 technical reports supporting what they have done at Chimo. To explain that further, I fully subscribe to the fact that any senior company interested in Chimo will disregard any technical report Cartier possessed in favour of conducting their own due diligence.

Moreover, most sophisticated investors in the sector can review the drill results and historical mine data and construct an economic model for the revitalized mine and have an idea of its potential value.

The problem, at the moment, is the company says they are targeting the retail market, who, by and large, don’t have the necessary skills to calculate the value of Chimo. Instead, they are depending on someone else’s opinion to gauge its potential value.

NOTE: On a high level, to model Chimo effectively, you would need to have a grip on two important points; the resource size and grade and cost of dewatering the flooded shaft and underground workings. With realistic values for these 2 points, you could model the project using the costs and tax structures from other economic studies or mines in the general Val d’Or area.

In open discussion with CEO Cloutier, this point hasn’t been overlooked by the management team. They are now, however, in a position that requires them to conserve money and await a buyer for Chimo. The conservation of cash allows Cartier to weather any storm that may be headed their way when it comes to negotiation for Chimo.

Takeover Candidates

Who would be a likely candidate to purchase Chimo?

That’s a great question and one that’s key to Cartier’s investment proposition.

First and foremost, the obvious candidate is O3 Mining, which, over the last month or so, has bought up a ton of land around Chimo, through their purchases of Chalice Gold Mines and Alexandria Minerals.

O3 Mining is a new company formed by the Osisko Mining team, whose track record supports an aggressive approach to all aspects of mining company development.

In my opinion, if O3 were interested in Chimo, it wouldn’t be for the short-term production capability, it would be because they see the potential for a much larger system in the area, Chimo just being one of the key pieces.

Additionally, I have heard Agnico Eagle’s name come up as a potential suitor for the purchase of Chimo.  I’m less inclined to believe they are a better candidate than O3 to make the purchase, because Chimo, at this point, is much smaller in both resource size and land position than would typically entice a major’s attention.

While O3 and Agnico are arguably the top takeover candidates, it could be a much smaller producer with underground experience that is willing to take on this small short-term production capability story, but they will have to be well financed to make it happen.

Time will tell.

Concluding Remarks

Personally, I do see the value in owning Cartier, even without having modelled Chimo. They are cashed up, have a good management team, and have a bunch of other high potential projects that are just waiting in the wings as far as exploration goes.

Without a doubt, there will be a buyer for Chimo, it’s just a matter of price and when it will happen.

A potential investor must realize that a deal may not be imminent and understand that Cartier will be in hibernation mode until a deal can be made. Depending on your investment outlook and level of patience, this could be a deal breaker.

Don’t want to miss a new investment idea, interview or financial product review? Become a Junior Stock Review VIP now – it’s FREE!

Until next time,

Brian Leni  P.Eng

Founder – Junior Stock Review

Disclaimer: The following is not an investment recommendation, it is an investment idea. I am not a certified investment professional, nor do I know you and your individual investment needs. Please perform your own due diligence to decide whether this is a company and sector that is best suited for your personal investment criteria. I have NO business relationship with Cartier Resources, nor do I currently own any shares.  However, all of my expenses for the site visit were paid for.

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AbraPlata Resources – An Undervalued, Well-financed Silver Company with a Portfolio of JV Ready Projects

AbraPlata Resources

In the first half of 2019, most of the questions I received from readers involved the gold price and where I thought it was headed. Now, 8 months later and with the gold price surpassing US$1500/oz, the focus of the questions has shifted to the other precious metal – silver.

Silver is often referred to as gold on steroids, as historically it has outperformed gold both to the upside and downside depending on the direction of the market.  Today, the silver price has eclipsed US$18.50/oz and, at this rate, may even surpass US$20/oz by the end of 2019.

The factors driving the silver price are closely related to those driving gold, mainly the FED lowering interest rates, the talk of further QE, negative interest in Europe, the turmoil surrounding the U.S. and China trade war, and the ever-increasing list of financial calamities around the world.

Additionally, silver has a component of industrial use, which I think is the added driver of its volatility.

The rising silver price has brought with it a large amount of speculative cash which is flowing into many of the junior silver companies. Reviewing my watch list, many of these companies are up by huge amounts, mostly for no reason other than they offer perceived leverage to the silver price.

It’s the classic buying of junior resource companies because of a bullish outlook for a metal. This mentality in the junior resource sector, while it may bring short-term gains, will ultimately lose money for investors over the long term.

Junior resource companies are speculations on management’s ability to execute on a well thought out plan, which aligns with their overall vision for the company. If people can’t execute, it doesn’t matter where the metal price goes, the metal will either not be discovered or developed into a mine – period.

Today, I have for you a company which is led by good management, has roughly $3 million in cash, a high potential flagship asset – Diablillos – which has an existing M&I resource with around 140 Moz of silver equivalent, a portfolio of Chilean projects ready for JV, and a great plan to bring value to shareholders.

This company is the newly proposed AbraPlata Resources, which is expected to announce a definitive agreement regarding a merger with Aethon Minerals very soon.

Let’s take a closer look.

Merger – Aethon Minerals and AbraPlata Resources

Earlier this year, Aethon announced that they had struck a deal which would give them the exclusive right to perform technical due diligence, over a 5 month period, on AbraPlata Resource’s Diablillos silver-gold project in Argentina.

For this exclusive right, Aethon paid AbraPlata US$50,000 and agreed to spend at least US$150,000 on expenditures in connection with a metallurgical testing program and other related test work.  At the end of the 5 month period, Aethon could then acquire a 50% or greater interest in the project.

Five months later, Aethon and AbraPlata announced that they had agreed in principle to a merger of the two companies, creating a new junior with a great flagship asset in Diablillos, a portfolio of JV ready projects in Chile, and around $3 million in cash.

Additionally, I think it’s important to point out that the merger signals that the money Aethon spent on testing the deposit’s metallurgy must have returned good results or this merger wouldn’t be happening. A HUGE plus for both sets of shareholders, because it’s one thing to own a deposit, but without the economic ability to liberate and concentrate the mineral, it’s worthless!

NOTE: In accordance with the merger agreement, AbraPlata will issue 3.75 shares for every share of Aethon. At the time of writing, there is an arbitrage opportunity in owning Aethon shares, which are selling at a discount to the deal.

I fully expect to see the announcement of a definitive agreement in the coming days, and would expect the transaction to close before the end of the year. 

Aethon Minerals (AET:TSXV)

MCAP – $6.3 million (at the time of writing)

Share Price – $0.23

Shares – 27.6 million

FD – 46.3 million

AbraPlata Resources (ABRA:TSXV)

MCAP – $6.7 million (at the time of writing)

Share Price – $0.075

Shares – 96.7 million

FD – 131.5 million

People

In early 2018, Altius Minerals spun out a portfolio of its Chilean projects into Aethon Minerals. For those who don’t know, Altius is focused on the mining and resource sector through prospect generation, and the creation and acquisition of royalties and investments.

Over the course of my investing career, I have learned that to make money consistently, it’s of the utmost importance to identify and invest in the best people. I believe it’s a given that Altius has a keen interest in the success of the newly formed AbraPlata Resources and, therefore, with the appointment of Aethon’s interim CEO as its leader, John Miniotis, I believe it speaks volumes about his abilities and future in the mining business.

AbraPlata will be Miniotis’ first crack at being a CEO, but he certainly isn’t a newbie to the industry, as he has over 14 years of experience, previously working at AuRico Metals, Lundin Mining and Barrick Gold, as well as roles in equity research with BMO Capital Markets and Wellington West Capital Markets.

Miniotis is technically supported by Chief Geologist, David O’Connor, who is currently based out of Chile. O’Connor is a veteran of the industry with over 40 years of experience, founding or co-founding 5 publically listed companies, discovering the El Espino deposit in Chile, leading early exploration for Western Mining Corp. at the Olympic Dam deposit, and Chief geologist of Peko-Wallsend in Australia.

Additionally, with the merger of the two companies, a new Board of Directors will be announced. Right now, we know that current AbraPlata interim CEO and Director, Rob Bruggeman, will become the Chairman and the remaining seats will be broken down as follows: two directors nominated by AbraPlata, two directors nominated by Aethon, one director by SSR Mining and one director nominated by Altius Minerals.

This should prove to be very good for the new company, as this should ensure that there will be good representation on the board with people who have creditable mining experience in Argentina and, most importantly, in-depth knowledge of their flagship Diablillos Silver-Gold Project.

With the support of Altius and the financial backing of Sprott Asset Management, who is also a major shareholder, the newly formed AbraPlata has all it needs to be a success in the future.

Diablillos Silver-Gold Project

  • 2018 PEA: After-tax NPV@7.5% – US$212 million, After-tax IRR of 30.2% at US1300/oz gold and US$20/oz silver.
    • 6,000 tpd open pit mining operation, producing 9.8 Moz AgEq per year
    • Open pit estimated initial CAPEX US$293 million, includes US$91 of pre-stripping cost
  • 2017 Historical Resource – 140 Moz @ 161 g/t Ag Eq or 1.7 Moz @ 2.0 g/t  Au Eq at spot prices
  • Aethon successfully completed, pre-merger, extensive testing of the Oculto deposit’s metallurgy, ensuring that the PEA results are representative of the entire deposit, not just a specific zone.
  • SSR Mining is the original vendor of the project and supports the transaction and has agreed to delay property payments of US$5 million and US$7 million by four years (see March 1st press release). I expect further detail of the payments to SSR to be given at the time of the announcement of the definitive agreement regarding the merger.

Last week, I discussed the potential of the Oculto deposit expansion with Miniotis and O’Connor. O’Connor highlighted some of the high grade core associated with breccias zones, where high grades have been intercepted over broad widths in historical drilling.

Interestingly, reviewing some of the historical results, you can see that these intercepts have some really good high grade hits.  A few of the highlights are: 98.5m of 861 g/t silver and 3.98 g/t gold, 27.7m of 2,192 g/t silver and 0.45 g/t gold and 54m of 2,292 g/t silver and 0.46 g/t gold.

This is especially great because, in our discussion, Miniotis brought up the possibility of changing the mine plan from open pit to an underground operation, which has the potential to dramatically drop the initial CAPEX cost needed to bring Diablillos to production.

Upon completion of the merger, priority number one for AbraPlata will be to establish continuity between these intercepts, at a drill spacing where they can be added to an updated resource calculation. Miniotis expects the drill program will cost roughly $1 million, making it easily affordable with their cash position.

The second priority will be to explore some of the satellite breccia deposits, which sit within 1 to 2 km of Oculto and could be potentially mined in a future production scenario.

In my opinion, there’s a clear path to improving the NPV of Diablillos in a big way and, most advantageous, is investors really don’t have to wait that long to get an idea of how much better the project economics will be.

Chilean Project Portfolio

The newly formed AbraPlata will own 100% of a large prospective land package, totalling over 100,000 ha in northern Chile. The land package includes the Arcas Copper-Gold Project, Maricunga Gold Project and the Peineta Gold-Silver Project, which all sit in close proximity to some of the most prospective ground in South America.

Each project is ready for JV with a partner and I fully expect to hear news of a new partnership before the end of the year.  The prospect generator model is great way to mitigate risk in the mining industry, and for a company like AbraPlata, who has a focus on their flagship Diablillos, any JV partnership is like icing on the cake, as the partner is on the hook for the exploration funding.

Currently, this aspect of the company has been overlooked by the market, but I expect that to change quickly in the weeks ahead.

Chile and Argentina

Jurisdictional risk is everywhere; no matter where you look, there’s always a chance that your money will be lost due to some country or region’s political calamity.

In saying this, I do think that certain countries come with a higher probability of an investor realizing a loss in their investment due to their chaotic state.

The newly formed AbraPlata Resources has projects in Chile and Argentina, two countries which, besides sharing a border, are very different in terms of their perceived mining investment risk profile. Currently, Chile is considered one of the best places for mining investment; the Fraser Institute which ranks countries in terms of their mining investment attractiveness gave Chile a score of 84.90, placing it 6th in the world.

Given this, I don’t think that we have to go into much detail about the merits of Chile and why I believe it’s as good as it comes in terms of mining jurisdictions.

While Chile ranks very high, Argentina on the other hand has been riddled with issues over the last 20 years, from 2001’s $100 billion sovereign debt default, to the controversial two term presidency of Christine Fernandez de Kirchner from 2007 to 2015.

Here’s a brief summary of some of the most contested issues during her reign:

  • Heavy government spending in social programs by both Nestor Kirchner (President 2003 to 2007) and his wife, Christine (President 2007 to 2015).
  • In 2012, Argentina’s congress nationalized Repsol’s (a Spanish oil company) portion in the national energy company, YPF. Kirchner defended the move by stating, “it failed to boost oil and natural gas production needed to keep up with local demand” (Reuters).
  • Nationalized private pension funds, known as “Las Administradoras de Fondos de Jubilaciones y Pensiones (AFJP)” (Wiki).
  • Kirchner fostered relationships with China, Venezuela and Iran.
  • Nisman Allegations – Kirchner and Argentine Foreign Minister, Hector Timerman, were allegedly involved in a plot to cover up Iran’s role in the 1994 bombing of the Amia Jewish Community Centre, in which 85 people were killed. Alberto Nisman, who was investigating this bombing, made the allegations against Kirchner and Timerman.  Days after the allegations, Nisman was found dead in his apartment.
  • Raised taxes on exports, which the government later overturned, due to mass protests.

Mauricio Macri defeated Kirchner in Argentina’s 2016 Presidential election and was widely regarded as the man to turn Argentina’s economy around. While he didn’t stir up as much controversy as Kirchner, he has had his own issues trying to turn around Argentina’s economy.

Today, Argentina sits with higher levels of poverty than four years ago, a Peso which has dramatically devalued against the US dollar, and now an upcoming election which could see the return of Kirchner, albeit in a Vice President’s role to Presidential candidate, Alberto Fernandez, who just recently won the primary election, called PASO (Primarias Abietas Simultaneas y Obligatorias).

PASO allows parties that receive at least 1.5% of the vote to participate in the general election on October 27th, 2019.

Fernandez hasn’t won yet, but the results of the PASO election put a lot of doubt on Macri retaining the presidency. The possibility of Kirchner having any political influence given what happened during her past terms as President is a great glimpse into the culture of Argentina.

I have said it before, cultures take hundreds of years to change and, while they may appear to be better in the short term, rarely is it ever sustainable, as the society’s true colours will always show.

So what does this mean in terms of investment in Argentina?

First and foremost, no doubt there’s risk associated with this potential change in government leadership, as left-leaning political ideology has a long history of being bad for a country’s economics.

Given Kirchner’s history, I’m sure many investors may be concerned with the possibility of the government nationalizing the Diablillos Project. However, I think that there is very little chance of that happening at this point, because of where the project is in its development.

Bottom line, Diablillos is at least a couple of years away from this becoming a mine and, by that time, we should have a better idea of how much of a threat the Argentine government might be.

Salta Province

One other note; all of the discussion, thus far, has centred around the politics at the federal level, however, it’s arguably more important to focus on how mining is viewed within the specific Argentine province with which the project is located, as there’s a lot of variation among them.

Diablillos is located in the Salta province, which is in the northwest portion of the country. Salta has a long history with mining, with a variety of metals being mined across the province. The most famous, because of the battery metal craze, may be Salta’s lithium brine mines, which are a part of the world-famous lithium triangle.

Thus, Salta is known for being supportive of mining and have provided a framework in which permitting applications are expeditiously vetted.

Further, amongst the political turmoil at the federal level, senior mining companies such as First Quantum have continued to put money into Salta. In 2014, they acquired the Taca Taca Project for roughly $500 million; not a small amount of money.

Finally, with all things considered and you contrast the political risks against the upside potential in the newly formed AbraPlata,  I think the political risk associated with Argentina is acceptable.

Concluding Remarks

AbraPlata Resources presents an attractive investment proposition as demonstrated by its MCAP; the investor has a high potential for success versus the risk associated with the company.

Here’s a summary of AbraPlata’s upside potential:

  • Good management – supported by Altius Minerals, SSR Mining and Sprott Asset Management
  • MCAP is currently valued at roughly 10% of 2018 PEA on Diablillos
    • After-tax NPV@7.5% of US$212 million, After-tax IRR of 30.2% at US1300/oz gold and US$20/oz silver
    • Indicated Resource – 80.9 Moz @ 93.1 g/t silver and 732 koz @0.84 g/t gold
    • Potential to improve NPV through resource expansion at depth and along strike
    • Potential to drastically reduce initial CAPEX by changing the mine plan to an underground operation
  • No value given to its Chilean Project Portfolio – Arcas Copper-Gold Project, Maricunga Gold Project and Peineta Gold-Silver Project – All are JV-ready opportunities.
    • The prospect generator business model has the JV partners fund the exploration of the projects – drastically reducing the risk associated with exploration.
    • If you consider that many prospect generators, albeit with JV partners in place, have, in many cases, MCAPs of CAD$30 million alone, AbraPlata’s current value proposition is very good.
  • Roughly $3 million in cash

No investment is without risk, including an investment in AbraPlata. Given the upside potential that I see in the company, however, especially in a rising precious metals environment, I believe AbraPlata is in for a dramatic market re-rating once the merger is complete.

I’m an owner and will continue to be a buyer of AbraPlata on weakness in the weeks ahead, as they set forth on what should be an exciting fall of exploration at Diablillos.

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Until next time,

Brian Leni  P.Eng

Founder – Junior Stock Review

Disclaimer: The following is not an investment recommendation, it is an investment idea. I am not a certified investment professional, nor do I know you and your individual investment needs. Please perform your own due diligence to decide whether this is a company and sector that is best suited for your personal investment criteria. I have NO business relationship with any of the companies discussed in this article – Altius Minerals, Aethon Minerals, AbraPlata Resources. I do own shares in Altius Minerals and Aethon Minerals.